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Empirical work on bank loans typically regresses loan spreads (markups of loan inter-
est rates over a benchmark rate) on observed characteristics of banks, ﬁrms, and loans.
The estimation is problematic when some of these characteristics are only partially ob-
served and the matching of banks and ﬁrms is endogenously determined because they
prefer partners that have higher quality. We study the U.S. bank loan market with a
two-sided matching model to control for the endogenous matching, and obtain Bayesian
inference using a Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation. We ﬁnd evidence
of positive assortative matching of sizes, explained by similar relationships between
quality and size on both sides of the market. Banks’ risk and ﬁrms’ risk are important
factors in their quality. Controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact
on estimated coeﬃcients in the loan spread equation.
KEYWORDS: Two-Sided Matching, Loan Spread, Bayesian Inference, Gibbs Sam-
pling with Data Augmentation
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Bank loans play a unique role in corporate ﬁnancing. They are important not only for small busi-
nesses, which often lack access to public debt markets, but also for large corporations, which depend
on them as a reliable source of liquidity helping to insulate them from market shocks (Saidenberg
and Strahan, 1999; James and Smith, 2000). Furthermore, bank lending is an important conduit
for monetary policy and is closely linked to investment and macroeconomic activity (Kashyap and
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1Stein 1994). Not surprisingly, empirical researchers have long been interested in the pricing of
bank loans. For example, loan spreads (markups of loan interest rates over a benchmark rate)
are regressed on characteristics of banks, ﬁrms, and loans to examine the relationship between
collateral and risk in ﬁnancial contracting (Berger and Udell, 1990), and to provide evidence of the
bank lending channel of monetary transmission (Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 2002). However,
the non-randomness of the bank-ﬁrm pairs in the loan samples is typically ignored. In this paper,
we argue that banks and ﬁrms prefer to match with partners that have higher quality, so banks
choose ﬁrms, ﬁrms choose banks, and the matching outcome is endogenously determined. We show
that because of the endogeneity, the regressors in the loan spread equation are correlated with the
error term, so OLS estimation is problematic. We develop a two-sided matching model to take into
account the endogenous matching, and show that controlling for the endogenous matching has a
strong impact on the estimates.
Both ﬁrms and banks have strong economic incentives to choose their partners. When a bank
lends to a ﬁrm, the bank not only supplies credit to the ﬁrm but also provides monitoring, expert
advice, and endorsement based on reputation (e.g. Diamond, 1984 and 1991). Empirical evidence
suggests that those “by-products” are important for ﬁrms. For instance, Billet, Flannery and
Garﬁnkel (1995) and Johnson (1997) show that banks’ monitoring ability and reputation have
signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on borrowers’ performance in the stock market.
The size of a bank–the amount of its total assets–also plays an important role in ﬁrms’
choices. First, a larger bank is likely to have better diversiﬁed assets and a lower risk, making it
more attractive to ﬁrms. Second, the small size of a bank may place a constraint on its lending,
which is undesirable for a borrowing ﬁrm, since its subsequent loan requests could be denied and
it might have to ﬁnd a new lender and pay a switching cost. Third, large banks usually have more
organizational layers and face more severe information distortion problems than small banks, so they
are generally less eﬀective in processing and communicating borrower information, making them less
able to provide valuable client-speciﬁc monitoring and expert advice. Fourth, Brickley, Linck and
Smith (2003) observe that employees in small to medium-sized banks own higher percentages of their
banks’ stocks than employees in large banks. As a result the loan oﬃcers in small to medium-sized
banks have stronger incentives and will devote more eﬀort to collecting and processing borrower
information, which helps the banks better serve their clients. Thus the size of a bank has multiple
eﬀects on its quality perceived by ﬁrms and those eﬀects operate in opposite directions. Which
bank size is most attractive is determined by the net eﬀect.
2Banks’ characteristics aﬀect how much beneﬁtb o r r o w i n gﬁrms will receive, so ﬁrms prefer banks
that are better in those characteristics, e.g., banks with higher monitoring ability, better reputation,
suitable size, and so on. Banks are ranked by ﬁrms according to a composite quality index that
combines those characteristics.
Now consider banks’ choices. In making their lending decisions, loan oﬃcers in a bank screen
the applicants (ﬁrms) and provide loans only to those who are considered creditworthy. Firms
with lower leverage ratios (total debt/total assets) or higher current ratios (current assets/current
liabilities) are usually considered less risky and more creditworthy. Larger ﬁrms also have an
advantage here, because they generally have higher repaying ability and better diversiﬁed assets,
and are more likely to have well-documented track records and lower information costs.
However, the large size of a ﬁrm also has negative eﬀects on its attractiveness. Because larger
ﬁrms have stronger ﬁnancial needs, the loan made to a larger ﬁrm usually has a larger amount
and accounts for a higher percentage of the bank’s assets, thus reducing the bank’s diversiﬁcation.
Since banks prefer well diversiﬁed portfolios, the large size of a borrowing ﬁrm may be considered
unattractive. In addition, lending to a large ﬁrm means that the bank’s control over the ﬁrm’s
investment decisions will be relatively small, which is undesirable.1 Therefore, the size of a ﬁrm
also has multiple eﬀects on its quality perceived by banks, and which ﬁrm size is most attractive
depends on the relative magnitudes of those eﬀects. Firms are ranked by banks according to a
composite quality index that combines ﬁrms’ characteristics, such as their risks and their sizes.
The above analysis shows that there is endogenous two-sided matching in the loan market:
banks choose ﬁrms, ﬁrms choose banks, and they all prefer partners that have higher quality.
Consequently, ﬁrms with higher quality tend to match with banks with higher quality, and vice
versa.
In our model banks’ and ﬁrms’ quality are multidimensional, but to illustrate the implications
of the endogenous matching, we assume for a moment that a bank’s quality is solely determined
by its liquidity risk, and that a ﬁrm’s quality is solely determined by its information costs. Further
assume that banks’ liquidity risk, ﬁrms’ information costs, and non-price loan characteristics such
as maturity and loan size are determinants of loan spreads. The spread equation is:
rij = α0 + κLi + λIj + N0
ijα3 + νij,ν ij ∼ N(0,σ2
ν), (1)
where rij is the loan spread if bank i lends to ﬁrm j, Li is bank i’s liquidity risk, Ij is ﬁrm j’s
1See Rajan (1992) for a discussion on banks’ control over borrowers’ investment decisions.
3information costs, and Nij is the non-price loan characteristics.
Liquidity risk and information costs are not perfectly observed, and the bank’s ratio of cash to
total assets and the ﬁrm’s ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets are used
as their proxies, respectively. Assume
Li = ρCi + ηi,η i ∼ N(0,σ2
η), and
Ij = σPj + δj,δ j ∼ N(0,σ2
δ),
where Ci is bank i’s ratio of cash to total assets, and Pj is ﬁrm j’s ratio of PP&E to total assets.
Now equation (1) becomes
rij = α0 + κ(ρCi + ηi)+λ(σPj + δj)+N0
ijα3 + νij
= α0 + κρCi + λσPj + N0
ijα3 + κηi + λδj + νij. (2)
Note that the error term contains ηi and δj, the unobserved quality. Because of the endogenous
matching, the characteristics of the partner of a bank or a ﬁrm are correlated with the bank or the
ﬁrm’s unobserved quality. As a result, the regressors in the spread equation are correlated with
the error term, so OLS estimation of the equation is problematic.2 Furthermore, since any variable
that inﬂuences the matching aﬀects the error term through the unobserved quality, the method of
instrumental variables (IV) is not applicable here.
To take into account the endogenous matching, a many-to-one two-sided matching model in
the loan market is developed and estimated. The model is a special case of the College Admissions
Model, for which an equilibrium matching always exists (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990). The two-sided matching model is applied to markets in which agents are divided
into two sides and each participant chooses a partner or partners from the other side. Examples
include the labor market, the marriage market, the education market, and so on. There are a few
studies on two-sided matching in ﬁnancial markets. Sorensen (forthcoming) studies the matching
between venture capitalists and the companies in which they invest. Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt
(2005) study the matching between ﬁrms and their underwriters.
We obtain Bayesian inference using a Gibbs sampling algorithm (Geman and Geman, 1984;
Gelfand and Smith, 1990; Geweke, 1999) with data augmentation (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert
2The endogeneity problem that comes from the use of proxies in the matching context is recognized in the literature.
For example, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) describe the endogeneity problem introduced by the use of proxies in
analyzing the matching process of agricultural contracts.
4and Chib, 1993). The method iteratively simulates each block of the parameters and the latent
variables conditional on all the others to recover the joint posterior distribution. It transforms
an integration problem into a simulation problem and overcomes the computational diﬃculty of
integrating a highly nonlinear function over thousands of dimensions, most of which correspond
to the latent variables. The method is applied to the estimation of the optimal job search model
(Lancaster, 1997) and the selection model of hospital admissions (Geweke, Gowrisankaran, and
Town, 2003), among others. Sorensen (forthcoming) is the ﬁrst study that uses the method to
estimate a two-sided matching model, and is the paper closest to our study.
Our empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,369 U.S. loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007
ﬁrms from 1996 to 2003. We ﬁnd that positive assortative matching of sizes is prevalent in the loan
market, that is, large banks tend to match with large ﬁrms, and vice versa. We then show that for
agents on both sides of the market there are similar relationships between quality and size, which
lead to similar size rankings for both sides and explain the positive assortative matching of sizes.
Banks’ risk and ﬁrms’ risk are important factors in their quality. The Bayesian estimates of the
loan spread equation are markedly diﬀerent from the OLS estimates, indicating that controlling for
the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the speciﬁcation of the
model, Section 3 presents the empirical method for Bayesian inference, Section 4 describes the data,
Section 5 presents and interprets the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
The ﬁrst component of our model is a spread equation, in which the loan spread is a function
of the bank’s characteristics, the ﬁrm’s characteristics, and the non-price characteristics of the
loan. A two-sided matching model in the loan market supplements the spread equation to permit
non-random matching of banks and ﬁrms.
2.1 Spread Equation
We are interested in estimating the following spread equation:
rij = α0 + B0
iα1 + F0
jα2 + N0
ijα3 +  ij ≡ U0
ijα +  ij,  ij ∼ N(0,σ2
 ), (3)
where rij is the loan spread if bank i lends to ﬁrm j, Bi is a vector of bank i’s characteristics, Fj
is a vector of ﬁrm j’s characteristics, and Nij is the non-price loan characteristics.
5Prior studies, such as Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) and Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2004),
suggest that the bank’s monitoring ability and risk, as well as the ﬁrm’s risk and information costs
are important determinants of the loan spread. Those characteristics are not perfectly observed,
so we follow the literature and use proxies for them in the spread equation. Because estimation
of our model is numerically intensive, we focus on a parsimonious speciﬁcation to keep estimation
feasible.
Bank’s Monitoring Ability. According to the hold-up theory in Rajan (1992) and Diamond
and Rajan (2000), a bank that has superior monitoring ability can use its skills to extract higher
rents. Moreover, Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984, 1991) and Allen (1990) show that banks’
monitoring plays an important role in ﬁrms’ operation and provides value to them. Therefore, we
expect a bank that has higher monitoring ability to charge a higher spread.
A bank’s salaries-expenses ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of salaries and beneﬁts to total operating
expenses, is a proxy for its monitoring ability. Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2004) show that mon-
itoring activities are relatively labor-intensive, and that salaries can reﬂect the staﬀ’s ability and
performance in these activities.
Bank’s Risk. A bank’s risk comes from two sources: inadequate capital and low liquidity.
Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) suggest that a low capital-assets ratio reduces the bank’s
ability to extract repayment, therefore lowering the recovery rate in default and forcing the bank
to charge a higher spread. Furthermore, a bank that has higher liquidity (or lower liquidity risk)
is better able to meet the credit or cash needs of its borrowers, so it charges a higher spread.
A bank’s capital-assets ratio is a proxy for its capital adequacy, and its ratio of cash to total
assets is a proxy for its liquidity risk. The size of a bank (its total assets) is also a proxy for its
risk, since a larger bank is likely to have better diversiﬁed assets and lower risk.
Firm’s Risk. Proxies for a ﬁrm’s risk include the leverage ratio (total debt/total assets), the
current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), and the size of the ﬁrm.
Risk is positively related to the leverage ratio, so a ﬁrm that has a higher leverage ratio is
charged a higher spread, all else being equal. On the other hand, a ﬁrm with a higher current ratio
is considered less risky, so it is typically charged a lower spread. Due to the diversiﬁcation eﬀects of
increasing ﬁrm size, ﬁrm risk is negatively associated with ﬁrm assets, and a larger ﬁrm can usually
get a loan with a lower spread.
6Firm’s Information Costs. In general smaller ﬁrms pose larger information asymmetries
and are associated with higher information costs, because they typically lack well-documented
track records. So the size of a ﬁrm is also a proxy for information costs.
A n o t h e rp r o x yf o raﬁrm’s information costs is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E) to total assets, which indicates the relative signiﬁcance of tangible assets in the ﬁrm. A
ﬁrm with relatively more tangible assets poses smaller information asymmetries. Consequently it
can borrow at a lower spread, all else being equal.
Non-Price Loan Characteristics. Non-price loan characteristics are included on the right-
hand side of the spread equation as control variables. They are maturity (in months), natural log of
the loan facility size, purpose dummies such as “acquisition” and “recapitalization”, type dummies
such as “a revolver credit line with duration shorter than one year”, and a secured dummy. The
deﬁnitions of these variables are presented in Section 4.
2.2 Two-Sided Matching Model
To take into account the endogenous matching, a two-sided matching model is developed to supple-
ment the spread equation and address the sample selection problem resulting from the non-random
matching between banks and ﬁrms:
rij = α0 + B0
iα1 + F0
jα2 + N0
ijα3 +  ij ≡ U0









jγ + δj,δ j ∼ N(0,σ2
δ), (6)
mij =I ( bank i lends to ﬁrm j), (7)
where Qb
i is the quality index of bank i, Q
f
j is the quality index of ﬁrm j,a n dI(.) is the indicator
function. rij, Nij are observed iﬀ the match indicator mij =1 . ηi and δj are allowed to be
correlated with  ij.
In the two-sided matching model, whether mij equals one or zero is determined by both banks’
choices and ﬁrms’ choices, and the outcome corresponds to the unique equilibrium matching (deﬁned
later), which depends on the Qb
i’s and the Q
f
j’s.
Note that in the loan market, the two-sided matching process between banks and ﬁrms takes
place before loan spreads are determined. For example, Miller and Bavaria (2003) and Yago and
McCarthy (2004) document that in the second half of the 1990’s, “market-ﬂex language” became
7common in the loan market, which lets the pricing of a loan be determined after the loan agreement
is made. Because of this institutional feature, during the matching process banks and ﬁrms do not
know what the loan spreads would be. They take into account the expectation of the spreads,
which is a function of the characteristics of the agents. As long as those characteristics are linear in
expected spreads, the spread consideration is reﬂected in the quality indexes and the indexes can
be viewed as “spread-adjusted” quality indexes.
Agents, Quotas and Matches. Let It and Jt denote, respectively, the sets of banks and
ﬁrms in market t,w h e r et =1 ,2,...,T. It and Jt are ﬁnite and disjoint. The market subscript t is
sometimes dropped to simplify the notation.
In the empirical implementation of our model, a market is speciﬁed to contain all the ﬁrms that
borrow during a half-year and all the banks that lend to them. In our sample the vast majority of
ﬁrms borrow only once during a half-year. In such a short period of time, it is likely that a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial needs can be satisﬁed by a single loan, whereas borrowing multiple loans would increase
the administrative costs, such as the costs associated with the negotiation process. Therefore it is
reasonable to model that a ﬁrm matches with only one bank in a given market.
On the other hand, a bank often lends to multiple ﬁrms during a half-year. A bank’s lending
activity is restricted in two ways. First, loan assessment, approval, monitoring, and review processes
are relatively labor-intensive, and a bank’s lending activity is restricted by the amount of resources
that is available for these processes, e.g., the number of its loan oﬃcers. Consequently, the number
of loans that a bank can make during a given half-year is limited.3 Second, the total amount of
loans a bank can make may be constrained by the availability of deposits, the primary source of
funds for bank lending (Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000). Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) ﬁnd evidence
that the deposits constraint on bank lending operates only on small banks whose assets are less
than $100 million, and that larger banks are unconstrained because they have better access to
capital markets. In our sample less than 1% of the banks have assets lower than $100 million, so
the lending constraint posed by inadequate deposits is less of a concern. In our study we take the
limit on the total amount of loans as non-binding and take the limit on the number of loans as
binding to simplify the empirical implementation and make the model tractable.
In market t,b a n ki can lend to qit ﬁrms and ﬁrm j can borrow from only one bank. The
m o d e li sas p e c i a lc a s eo ft h em a n y - t o - o n et w o - s ided matching model, also known as the College
3In the long run, the limit on the number of loans that a bank can make during a half-year can change, since the
bank can hire or lay oﬀ loan oﬃcers if needed.
8Admissions Model (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). qit is known as the quota
of bank i in the matching literature, and every ﬁrm has a quota of one. We assume that each agent
uses up its quota in equilibrium.
The set of all potential loans, or matches,i sg i v e nb yMt = It × Jt.Amatching, μt,i sas e to f
matches such that (i,j) ∈ μt if and only if bank i and ﬁrm j are matched in market t.
Let μt(i) denote the set of ﬁrms that borrow from bank i in market t,a n dl e tμt(j) denote the
set of banks that lend to ﬁrm j in market t, which is a singleton. We then have
(i,j) ∈ μt ⇐⇒ j ∈ μt(i) ⇐⇒ i ∈ μt(j) ⇐⇒ {i} = μt(j).
Preferences. The matching of banks and ﬁrms is determined by the equilibrium outcome of
a two-sided matching process. The payoﬀ ﬁrm j receives if it borrows from bank i is Qb
i,a n dt h e




j.C o n s e q u e n t l y , e a c h




j0,a n de a c hﬁrm prefers bank i to bank i0 iﬀ Qb
i >Q b
i0.
The quality indexes are assumed to be distinct so there are no “ties”.
In our model there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the loan market: all banks have
identical preference orderings over the ﬁrms and all ﬁrms have identical preference orderings over
the banks. Consequently there is perfect sorting in the market. Vertical heterogeneity is assumed
in many economic applications. For example, Wong (2003) assumes that in the marriage market,
men and women are ranked by the other side of the market based on their “marriage indexes”.
Therefore, all women have a common preference ordering over men, and all men have a common
preference ordering over women. Other examples of vertical heterogeneity appear in the market for
lawyers in which they are ranked by law ﬁrms according to their quality (Spurr, 1987), the market
f o rw o r k e r si nw h i c ht h e ya r er a n k e db yﬁrms according to their productivity (Oi, 1983), and so on.
Vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the loan market guarantees that the equilibrium matching
is unique. We discuss that issue later.











Two features of the joint surplus are worth mentioning. First, the error term ωij consists of ηi
9and δj.A sar e s u l t ,cov(ωij,ωij0) 6=0and cov(ωij,ωi0j) 6=0 , ∀i 6= i0, j 6= j0.T h e r e f o r et h eωij’s are
not independent variables.
Second, in our model the joint surplus depends on bank characteristics and ﬁrm characteristics.
A more general model will include pair-speciﬁc surplus that depends on pair characteristics, such as
the bank’s expertise in the borrower’s industry and the distance between the agents’ headquarters,
and the division of the pair-speciﬁc surplus between the pair can be endogenous.4 Due to data
limitations and tractability concerns, we are unable to include pair characteristics in our model. In
the more general model, as long as the magnitudes of the pair-speciﬁc surplus are not large enough
to change the preference orderings, we will still have vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the
market. For example, if the quality indexes are distinct integers and the pair-speciﬁc surplus have
absolute values smaller than 0.5, then the preference orderings are still determined entirely by the
quality indexes.
Equilibrium Matching. A matching is an equilibrium if it is stable, that is, if there is no
blocking coalition of agents. A coalition of agents is blocking if they prefer to deviate from the
current matching and form new matches among them.
Formally, μt is an equilibrium matching in market t iﬀ there does not exist ˜ I ⊂ It, ˜ J ⊂ Jt and








j for all i ∈ ˜ I,a n d˜ μt(j) ∈ ˜ I and
Qb
˜ μt(j) >Q b
μt(j) for all j ∈ ˜ J.
The above stability concept is group stability. A related stability concept is pair-wise stability.
A matching is pair-wise stable if there is no blocking pair. In the College Admissions Model, Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) prove that pair-wise stability is equivalent to group stability and that an
equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, Eeckhout (2000, Corollary 3) shows that in a one-to-one
two-sided matching model, the equilibrium matching is unique if there is vertical heterogeneity
on both sides of the market. Appendix A shows that this suﬃcient condition for uniqueness also
applies to the many-to-one two-sided matching model. Therefore in our model there exists a unique
equilibrium matching.
Similar to Sorensen (forthcoming), the unique equilibrium matching here can be characterized
by a set of inequalities. These inequalities are constructed based on the fact that there is no
blocking bank-ﬁrm pair for the equilibrium matching. Consider an arbitrary matching in market
4See Stomper (forthcoming) for a discussion on banks’ industry expertise and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) for a
discussion on the importance of physical distance for information gathering.
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i0,w h e r ef(i) is the set of ﬁrms that do not currently borrow
from bank i but would prefer to do so, and f(j) is the set of banks that do not currently lend to
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t denote the (unique) equilibrium matching in market t. The above analysis leads to the











j), ∀j ∈ Jt,( 8 )
where
Qb





















This characterization of the equilibrium matching is used in the Bayesian inference method in
the next section.
113 Estimation
Two-sided matching in the loan market presents numerical challenges when it comes to estimation.
Maximum likelihood estimation requires integrating a highly nonlinear function over thousands of
dimensions, most of which correspond to the latent quality indexes. Instead we use a Gibbs sam-
pling algorithm that performs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations to obtain Bayesian
inference, and augment the observed data with simulated values of the latent data on quality in-
dexes so that the augmented data are straightforward to analyze. The method iteratively simulates
each block of the parameters and the latent variables conditional on all the others to recover the
joint posterior distribution. It transforms a high-dimensional integration problem into a simulation
problem and overcomes the computational diﬃculty.
3.1 Error Terms and Prior Distributions
Estimation of the quality index equations is subject to the usual identiﬁcation constraints in dis-
crete choice models, so ση and σδ are set to one to ﬁx the scales, and the constant and market
characteristics are excluded to ﬁx the levels.
To address the correlation among the error terms, we work with the population regression of
 ij on ηi and δj:




Thus cov( ij,ηi)=κ, cov( ij,δj)=λ,a n dσ2
  = κ2 +λ2 +σ2
ν. The signs in the two-sided matching
model are identiﬁed by requiring λ to be non-positive, consistent with the belief that ﬁrms with
higher unobserved quality (lower unobserved risk or unobserved information costs) are charged
lower loan spreads, everything else being equal.
The prior distributions are multivariate normal for α, β, γ, normal for κ, and truncated normal
for λ (truncated on the right at 0). The means of these prior distributions are zeros, and the
variance-covariance matrices are 10I,w h e r eI is an identity matrix. The prior distribution of
1/σ2
ν is gamma, 1/σ2
ν ∼ G(2.5,1). The above are diﬀuse priors that include reasonable parameter
values well within their supports. We try larger variances and other changes in the priors and the
estimates are left almost unchanged. For any parameter, the variance of the prior distribution is at
12least 233 times the variance of the posterior distribution, showing that the information contained
in the Bayesian inference is substantial.
3.2 Conditional Posterior Distributions
In the model, the exogenous variables are Bi, Fj,a n dNij, which are abbreviated as X.T h eo b s e r v e d
endogenous variables are rij (the loan spread) and mij (the match indicator). The unobserved
quality indexes are Qb
i and Q
f
j. The parameters are α, β, γ, κ, λ,a n d1/σ2
ν, which are abbreviated
as θ.I nm a r k e tt,l e tXt,r t,μ t and Q∗
t represent the above variables, where μt embodies all the
mij’s and Q∗
t denotes all the quality indexes.
The joint density of the endogenous variables and the quality indexes conditional on the exoge-









































where I(.) is the indicator function and φ(.;μ,σ2) is the N(μ,σ2) pdf. To obtain the likelihood
function for market tL t(θ)=p(rt,μ t | Xt,θ), we need to integrate p(rt,μ t,Q ∗
t | Xt,θ) over all
possible values of the quality indexes. Due to endogenous matching in the market, the bounds
on each agent’s quality index depend on other agents’ quality indexes, so the integral can not be
factored into a product of lower-dimensional integrals. The Gibbs sampling algorithm with data
augmentation transforms this high-dimensional integration problem into a simulation problem and
makes estimation feasible.
To keep our study tractable, we model the markets as independent, so the product of p(rt,μ t,Q ∗
t |
Xt,θ) for t =1 ,2,...,T gives the joint density p(r,μ,Q∗ | X,θ) for all the markets. From Bayes’
rule, the density of the posterior distribution of Q∗ and θ conditional on the data is
p(Q∗,θ | X,r,μ)=p(θ) × p(r,μ,Q∗ | X,θ)/p(r,μ | X)
= C × p(θ) × p(r,μ,Q∗ | X,θ) (10)
where C is a generic proportionality constant and p(θ) is the prior densities of the parameters.
Successful application of the Gibbs sampling algorithm requires simple conditional posterior
distributions of the quality indexes and the parameters from which random numbers can be
13generated at low computational costs. We obtain those distributions by examining the kernels
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where C1 and C2 are constants, then π ∼ N(−M−1N,M−1).T h e




j,a n dλ,m u l t i v a r i a t en o r m a lf o rα, β,a n dγ,n o r m a lf o rκ, and gamma for 1/σ2
ν.
3.3 Simulation
In the algorithm, the parameters and the quality indexes are partitioned into blocks. Each of
the parameter vectors (α, β, γ, κ, λ,a n d1/σ2
ν) and the quality indexes is a block. In market t
the number of quality indexes is equal to the number of agents, |It| + |Jt|, so altogether we have
T P
t=1
(|It| + |Jt|)+6blocks. In each iteration of the algorithm, each block is simulated conditional
on all the others according to the conditional posterior distributions, and the sequence of draws
converge in distribution to the joint distribution.5
Bayesian results reported in Section 5 are based on 20,000 draws from which the initial 2,000
are discarded to allow for burn-in. Using Matlab 6.5, these iterations took 52 hours on a computer
running Windows XP with a 1.3 GHZ Intel Pentium M processor. Visual inspection of the draws
shows that convergence to the stationary posterior distribution occurs within the burn-in period.
Convergence diagnostics from the Geweke test (Geweke, 1992) do not reject the hypotheses of equal
means between draws 2,001 ∼ 3,800 (the ﬁrst 10% after burn-in) and draws 11,001 ∼ 20,000 (the
last 50% after burn-in). Additionally, the Raftery-Lewis test (Raftery and Lewis, 1992) using all
the draws shows that a small amount of burn-in (6 draws) and a total of 8,700 draws are needed for
the estimated 95% highest posterior density intervals to have actual posterior probabilities between
0.94 and 0.96 with probability 0.95, indicating that reasonable accuracy can be achieved using the
draws we have.
4D a t a
We obtain the data from three sources. Information on loans comes from the DealScan database
produced by the Loan Pricing Corporation. To obtain information on bank characteristics, we
match the banks in DealScan to those in the Reports of Condition and Income (known as the Call
Reports) from the Federal Reserve Board. To obtain information on ﬁrm characteristics, we match
5The suﬃcient condition for convergence set forth in Roberts and Smith (1994) is satisﬁed.
14the ﬁrms in DealScan to those in the Compustat database, a product of Standard & Poor’s.
4.1 Sample
The DealScan database contains detailed information on lending to large businesses in the U.S.
dating back to 1988. The majority of the data come from commitment letters and credit agreements
in Securities and Exchange Commission ﬁlings, but data from large loan syndicators and the Loan
Pricing Corporation’s own staﬀ of reporters are also collected. For each loan facility, DealScan
reports the identities of the borrower and the lender, the pricing information (spread and fees), and
the information on non-price loan characteristics, such as maturity, secured status, purpose of the
loan, and type of the loan.
We focus on loan facilities between U.S. banks and U.S. ﬁrms from 1996 to 2003, and divide
them into sixteen markets, each containing all the lending banks and all the borrowing ﬁrms in a
same half-year: January to June or July to December.6 Data on banks’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics
are from the quarter that precedes the market.
A loan facility is included in the sample if the following criteria are satisﬁed: (1) Data on
characteristics of the loan, the bank, and the ﬁrm are not missing. (2) If there is more than one
lender, one and only one lead arranger is speciﬁed.7 (3) The ﬁrm borrows only once in the given
market. (4) The bank is matched to one and only one bank in the Call Report, and the ﬁrm is
matched to one and only one ﬁrm in the Compustat database.
The sample consists of 1,369 loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007 ﬁrms.8 Figure 1 plots
the number of banks and the number of ﬁrms in each market. The number of banks in each market
is relatively stable, while the number of ﬁrms exhibits a slightly upward trend. The number of
ﬁrms in each market is also the number of loan facilities in each market, since each ﬁrm borrows
only once in a given market.
6Changing the market deﬁnition from one half-year to one year or one quarter leaves our ﬁndings largely unaﬀected.
7When there are multiple lenders, the characteristics of the lead arranger are the most relevant for our analysis
and we take the lead arranger as the lending bank. Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) show that in syndicated loans,
the administrative, monitoring, and contract enforcement responsibilities lie primarily with the lead arranger.
8Some banks and some ﬁr m sp a r t i c i p a t e di nm o r et h a no n em a r k e t .T h en u m b e r so fb a n k si nt h em a r k e t sa d du p
to 455, and the numbers of ﬁrms in the markets add up to 1,369.
154.2 Variables
Information on loan spreads comes from the All-In Spread Drawn (AIS) reported in the DealScan
database. The AIS is expressed as a markup over the London Interbank Oﬀering Rate (LIBOR).
It equals the sum of the coupon spread, the annual fee, and any one-time fee divided by the loan
m a t u r i t y . T h eA I Si sg i v e ni nb a s i sp o i n t s( 1 basis point =0 .01%). Since several exogenous
variables in our study are expressed in percentage points, we divide the AIS by 100 to obtain rij.
Figure 2 plots the weighted average loan spread in percentage points for each market.
The matching of banks and ﬁrms (μ) is given by the names of the matched agents recorded in
our loan facilities data.
The right-hand side of the spread equation includes a constant, year dummies, and three groups
of exogenous variables. The ﬁrst group includes the following bank characteristics: salaries-expenses
ratio (salaries and beneﬁts/total operating expenses), capital-assets ratio (total equity capital/total
assets), ratio of cash to total assets (cash/total assets), and four size dummies. Each size dummy
corresponds to one ﬁfth of the banks with the cutoﬀsb e i n g$ 5 billion, $13 billion, $32 billion, and
$76 billion in assets. The size dummy for the smallest one ﬁfth is dropped. The size dummies
enable us to detect nonlinear relationships between sizes and loan spreads.
The second group includes the following ﬁrm characteristics: leverage ratio (total debt/total
assets), current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), ratio of property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E) to total assets (PP&E/total assets), and four size dummies. Each size dummy corresponds
to one ﬁfth of the ﬁrms with the cutoﬀsb e i n g$ 65 million, $200 million, $500 million, and $1,500
million in assets. The size dummy for the smallest one ﬁfth is dropped.
The third group includes the following non-price loan characteristics: maturity (in months),
natural log of facility size, purpose dummies, type dummies, and a secured dummy. The loan
purposes reported in DealScan are combined into ﬁve categories: acquisition (acquisition lines and
takeover), general (corporate purposes and working capital), miscellaneous (capital expenditure,
equipment purchase, IPO related ﬁnance, mortgage warehouse, project ﬁnance, purchase hardware,
real estate, securities purchase, spinoﬀ, stock buyback, telecom build-out, and trade ﬁnance), recap-
italization (debt repayment/debt consolidation/reﬁnancing and recapitalization), and other. The
purpose dummy for “other” is dropped. There are three categories of loan types: revolver/line <
1 year (a revolving credit line whose duration is less than one year), revolver/line ≥ 1y e a r ,a n d
other. The type dummy for “other” is dropped. A secured dummy is also included, which equals
16one if the loan facility requires a pledge of assets as collateral, and equals zero otherwise.
The right-hand side variables in the quality index equations are bank characteristics and ﬁrm
characteristics, respectively. Bank assets, ﬁrm assets, and facility size are deﬂated using the GDP
(Chained) Price Index reported in the Historical Tables in the Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment for Fiscal Year 2005, with the year 2000 being the base year. All ratios are expressed
in percentage points. Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions and sources of the variables, and Table 2
presents summary statistics.
5 Findings
In this section, we ﬁrst present evidence that positive assortative matching of sizes is prevalent
in the loan market, that is, large banks tend to match with large ﬁrms, and vice versa. We
then show that for agents on both sides of the market there are similar relationships between
quality and size: after controlling for other factors, the medium-sized agents are regarded as having
the highest quality, followed by the largest agents, and the smallest agents are at the bottom of
the list. Consequently there are similar size rankings on both sides, which explain the positive
assortative matching of sizes. Banks’ risk and ﬁrms’ risk are important factors in their quality.
The Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are markedly diﬀerent from the OLS estimates,
conﬁrming that controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates.
Finally, the eﬀects of bank characteristics, ﬁrm characteristics, and non-price loan characteristics
on loan spreads are examined.
5.1 Positive Assortative Matching of Sizes
It is recognized in the literature that large banks tend to lend to large ﬁrms and vice versa. See,
for example, Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) and Berger et al. (2005). To verify this positive
assortative matching of sizes, two OLS regressions using the matched pairs are run: the bank’s
size on the ﬁrm’s characteristics and the ﬁrm’s size on the bank’s characteristics. The results are
reported in Tables 3 and 4. It is shown that the bank’s size and the ﬁrm’s size are strongly positively
correlated. The coeﬃcients on partners’ sizes are both positive and have t statistics at about 20,
indicating that there is indeed positive assortative matching of sizes.
Figure 3 provides further evidence. It depicts the proportion of loans for each combination of
bank-ﬁrm size groups. For example, the height of the column at (2,3) represents the proportion
17of loans between banks in the second bank size group (with assets between the 20th and the 40th
percentiles) and ﬁrms in the third ﬁrm size group (with assets between the 40th and the 60th
percentiles). A clear pattern is observed: the highest columns are mostly on the main diagonal
(from (1,1) to (5,5)), whereas the columns far oﬀ the main diagonal (e.g., (1,5) and (5,1))a r e
rather short. The ﬁgure illustrates that most of the loans are between banks and ﬁrms that have
similar size positions on their respective sides.
5.2 Quality Indexes
Table 5 reports the posterior means and standard deviations of the coeﬃcients in the quality index
equations (5) and (6).
Sizes of the Agents. All the size dummies have positive coeﬃcients and most of them are
signiﬁcant, indicating that on both sides of the market, the group of the smallest agents–the
omitted group–is considered the worst in terms of quality.9 On the lenders’ side, the smallest
banks suﬀer from severe lending constraints and low reputation associated with their small sizes.
On the borrowers’ side, the smallest ﬁrms are considered the least creditworthy because they have
low repaying ability and less diversiﬁed assets, and lack well-documented track records to convince
the lenders.
Ac l o s e rl o o ka tt h ec o e ﬃcients reveals that on both sides of the market, it is the medium-sized
agents who have the highest quality. Banks with assets between the 40th and the 80th percentiles
(group 3 and group 4) and ﬁrms with assets between the 40th and the 60th percentiles (group 3)
are the most attractive. The largest agents are less attractive than the medium-sized ones, but are
better than the smallest ones.
As the size of a bank increases, it has lower risk and greater lending capacity, making it more
attractive. On the other hand, larger banks typically have more severe information distortion
problems, and their loan oﬃcers have weaker incentives in collecting and processing borrower infor-
mation. For the group of the largest banks, these negative eﬀects outweigh the banks’ advantages
over the medium-sized banks in terms of risk and lending capacity.
S i m i l a r l y ,a st h es i z eo faﬁrm increases, its repaying ability grows, its assets are more diversiﬁed,
and it can better provide information that is needed to prove its creditworthiness. However, the
9Here and henceforth statistical signiﬁcance of Bayesian estimates is taken to mean that zero is not contained in
the corresponding highest posterior density intervals.
18group of the largest ﬁrms are less attractive than the medium-sized ﬁrms because lending to the
largest ﬁrms means that the bank’s assets will be less diversiﬁed and that its control over the ﬁrms’
investment decisions will be weaker, and these disadvantages of the largest ﬁrms dominate their
advantages over the medium-sized ﬁrms.
Note that the negative eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s large size on its quality is likely understated, since in
our model the limit on the number of loans a bank can make is binding and the limit on the total
amount of loans is non-binding. If we take into account that sometimes the binding limit is on the
total amount of loans, then lending to a large ﬁrm should be less attractive: the size of the loan
will typically be large, which means that the bank may have to sacriﬁce more than one lending
opportunity elsewhere in order to lend to this large ﬁrm, impairing the bank’s assets diversiﬁcation.
The size rankings for both sides of the loan market are similar. From the highest quality to
the lowest quality, the size ranking is 4-3-2-5-1 for the banks and 3-4-2-5-1 for the ﬁrms, where the
numbers represent the size groups. All else being equal, the medium-sized agents have higher quality
than the largest ones, which in turn have higher quality than the smallest ones. That explains the
positive assortative matching of sizes. Medium-sized banks lend to medium-sized ﬁrms because
both groups are the top candidates on their respective sides. Among the remaining agents, who
face restricted choice sets, the largest banks and the largest ﬁrms are the top candidates, so they
are matched. Finally, the smallest banks and the smallest ﬁrms have the lowest quality, and they
have no choice but to match with each other.
Other Factors. On the banks’ side, the coeﬃcient on the ratio of cash to total assets is
positive and signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the negative impact of banks’ liquidity risk on their quality. The
coeﬃcients on the salaries-expenses ratio and the capital-assets ratio are both positive, consistent
with the hypothesis that banks with higher monitoring ability and/or higher capital adequacy are
more attractive. These two coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant, suggesting that in our sample the inﬂuence
of these two ratios on the banks’ quality is weak.
On the ﬁrms’ side, the current ratio has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, supporting the
view that a ﬁrm’s quality is negatively related to its risk, for which the current ratio is a proxy.
The other two variables both have the expected signs. The coeﬃcient on the leverage ratio is
negative, indicating that ﬁrms with higher leverage ratios are less attractive because they are
riskier. The coeﬃcient on the ratio of PP&E to total assets has a positive sign, suggesting that
ﬁrms with relatively more tangible assets have higher quality because they pose smaller information
19asymmetries. The fact that these two coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant indicates that in our sample these
two ratios are not important concerns of the banks when they rank the borrowers.
Marginal Eﬀects. For interpretation of the coeﬃcients, Table 5 also reports the marginal
eﬀects of the variables. The marginal eﬀect of a variable is deﬁned as the marginal change in an
agent’s probability of being preferred to another agent due to a unit diﬀerence in the variable. The
probability that bank i is preferred to bank i0 is
Prob(B0
iβ + ηi >B 0











where Φ(.) is the standard normal cdf. The probability that ﬁrm j is preferred to ﬁrm j0 is obtained
analogously. Consider a ﬁrm’s choice between two banks. If the two banks have no diﬀerence in
their observed characteristics, then the choice is completely determined by the unobserved quality,
and the probability of each bank being preferred to the other is 50%. Now suppose one of the banks
is in the smallest group and the other is in the second smallest group, then the probability that the
larger bank is preferred to the smaller bank is 61.32%, representing a marginal increase of 11.32%.
Table 5 shows that banks’ ratios have much larger marginal eﬀects than ﬁrms’ ratios, and that all
the size dummies have noticeable marginal eﬀects. For instance, everything else being equal, a bank
in the middle size group is preferred to one in the smallest group with probability 64.54%,a n da
ﬁrm in the middle size group is preferred to one in the smallest group with probability 58.13%.
5.3 Loan Spread Determinants
The covariance between the error terms in the loan spread equation and the bank quality index
equation, κ, is found to be signiﬁcant (Table 5). That is evidence that the matching process is
correlated with the loan spread determination and can not be ignored. To see that the mij’s are
correlated with the  ij’s, rewrite the spread equation as follows, noting that each ﬁrm borrows only
once in a market:
rj = α0 + m0
jBα1 + F0
jα2 + N0
jα3 +  j (11)




jη + λδj + νj,ν j ∼ N(0,σ2
ν), (12)
where rj is the spread that ﬁrm j pays, mj =( m1j,m 2j,...,m Ij)0 is the vector of match indicators,
B =( B1,B 2,...B I)0 is the matrix of bank characteristics, Nj is the non-price loan characteristics
of the loan ﬁrm j borrows, and η =( η1,η2,...,ηI)0 is the vector of error terms in the bank quality
20index equation. If mj were in fact independent of  j–as it would be if ﬁrms were randomly matched
to banks–then mj would be exogenous in equation (11). However, a signiﬁcant κ shows that mj
is correlated with  j. Because the regressors are correlatedw i t ht h ee r r o rt e r m ,O L Se s t i m a t i o n
of the equation is problematic. Furthermore, since any variable that inﬂuences the matching also
aﬀects  j, the method of instrumental variables (IV) is not applicable here.
The Bayesian estimates (Table 6) and the OLS estimates (Table 7) of the loan spread equa-
tion are markedly diﬀerent. The average absolute percentage diﬀerence, deﬁned as the average of
¯ ¯ ¯(ˆ θOLS − ˆ θBayesian)/ˆ θBayesian
¯ ¯ ¯ across all the variables including the year dummies, is 23%,w h e r e
ˆ θOLS is the OLS estimates and ˆ θBayesian is the Bayesian estimates. The average absolute percentage
diﬀerence for the eight variables that are signiﬁcant in the quality index equations is 39%,s i g n i f y i n g
the impact of controlling for the endogenous matching on the loan spread equation estimates. Table
8 compares the two sets of estimates side by side for those eight variables. The absolute percentage
diﬀerences range from 7% to 175%. For instance, the spread diﬀerential between a bank in the
smallest size group and a bank in the middle size group is overstated by 46% when the endogenous
matching is ignored.
Directions of the Diﬀerences. The unobserved quality of banks has two components that
aﬀect the loan spreads in opposite directions: unobserved monitoring ability and unobserved risk. If
the ﬁrst component dominates, then the unobserved bank quality will be positively correlated with
the loan spreads, because banks with higher unobserved monitoring ability have higher unobserved
quality and will charge higher loan spreads, all else being equal. On the other hand, if the second
component dominates, then the unobserved bank quality will be negatively correlated with the
loan spreads, because banks with lower unobserved risk have higher unobserved quality and will
charge lower loan spreads, all else being equal. The positive sign of κ shows that the unobserved
monitoring ability dominates the unobserved risk to be the main component in banks’ unobserved
quality. The result is an indication that the proxies for banks’ risk do a better job than the proxy
for banks’ monitoring ability.
The unobserved quality of ﬁrms has two components that aﬀect the loan spreads in the same
direction: unobserved risk and unobserved information costs. Firms with either higher unobserved
risk or higher unobserved information costs have lower unobserved quality and are charged higher
loan spreads, all else being equal. The negative sign of λ is consistent with this relationship.
Given the signs of κ and λ, the directions of the diﬀerences between the OLS estimates and
21the Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are as expected. Five variables have signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the bank quality index equation: the ratio of cash to total assets and the four size
dummies. All these variables positively aﬀect banks’ quality. Now take the ratio of cash to total
assets for example. Suppose all ﬁrms are identical except that they have diﬀerent unobserved
quality, and consider two banks that diﬀer only in their ratios of cash to total assets. The bank
with a higher ratio has a higher quality, so it matches with a ﬁrm that has a higher unobserved
quality. Since λ is negative, the higher unobserved quality of the ﬁrm means that the spread
charged by this bank has a smaller unobserved component. In an OLS regression of the loan
spread equation, the eﬀect of that smaller unobserved component on the loan spread is incorrectly
attributed to the diﬀerence in the ratio, resulting in underestimation (downward bias) of the ratio’s
coeﬃcient. Similarly, the coeﬃcients on the four bank size dummies are all underestimated in the
OLS regression.
In the ﬁrm quality index equation, three variables have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients: the current ratio
and two size dummies. All these variables positively aﬀect ﬁrms’ quality. Since κ is positive, by an
analogous argument, the OLS regression of the loan spread equation would result in overestimation
(upward bias) of the coeﬃcients on all these variables. That is exactly what happens.
We now analyze the loan spread determinants according to the Bayesian estimates.
Bank Characteristics. The salaries-expenses ratio has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
showing that banks with superior monitoring ability indeed charge higher loan spreads. The coef-
ﬁcients on the capital-assets ratio and the ratio of cash to total assets are insigniﬁcant, suggesting
that in our sample, banks’ capital adequacy risk and liquidity risk do not have a signiﬁcant impact
on loan spreads. The coeﬃcients on the bank size dummies are all negative and most of them are
signiﬁcant, supporting the view that larger banks are likely to have better diversiﬁed assets and
hence lower risk, so that they charge lower loan spreads. As expected, these coeﬃcients exhibit
a downward trend. Compared to banks with assets below the 20th percentile, banks with assets
between the 20th and the 60th percentiles charge loan spreads that are about 15 basis points lower,
whereas banks with assets above the 60th percentile charge loan spreads that are nearly 30 basis
points lower.
Firm Characteristics. Two ﬁrm ratios have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients: the leverage ratio (posi-
tive) and the current ratio (negative). A higher leverage ratio or a lower current ratio represents a
higher borrower risk, so the signs of the coeﬃcients conﬁrm that ﬁrms with higher risk are charged
22higher loan spreads. The coeﬃcient on the ratio of PP&E to total assets is insigniﬁcant, suggesting
that the ratio does not substantially aﬀect borrowers’ costs of funds. On the other hand, all the
ﬁrm size dummies have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, consistent with the hypothesis that
larger ﬁrms are charged lower loan spreads because they are less risky and are associated with lower
information costs. The coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm size dummies also exhibit a downward trend. For
example, compared to ﬁrms with assets below the 20th percentile, ﬁrms with assets between the
20th and the 40th percentiles are charged loan spreads that are 22 basis points lower, whereas ﬁrms
with assets above the 80th percentile are charged loan spreads that are 46 b a s i sp o i n t sl o w e r .
Non-Price Loan Characteristics. Three non-price loan characteristics have signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients: the natural log of facility size, the revolver/line>=1 year dummy, and the secured dummy.
The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the natural log of facility size is likely due to economies
of scale in bank lending. The processes of loan approval, monitoring, and review are relatively labor-
intensive, and the labor costs in these processes increase less than proportionally when the size of
the loan increases. As a result, a larger loan has a lower average labor costs and is therefore charged
a lower loan spread.
The dummy for revolving credit lines whose durations are greater than or equal to one year has
a negative coeﬃc i e n tt h a ti ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level. Since that type of loans are by far the
most common, accounting for 67% of all loans, the negative coeﬃcient may reﬂe c tt h a to t h e rt y p e s
of loans are non-standard or even custom-made, and are charged higher loan spreads to compensate
for the banks’ extra administrative costs resulting from the loans’ non-standard nature.
The secured dummy has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. An unsecured loan is also called
a character loan or a good faith loan, and is granted by the lender on the strength of the borrower’s
creditworthiness, rather than a pledge of assets as collateral. The positive coeﬃcient on the secured
dummy shows that a higher loan spread is charged if the borrower is below the lender’s threshold
for an unsecured loan.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have the potential to learn a lot about ﬁnancial markets and the eﬀects of monetary policy
by investigating the pricing of bank loans. For example, empirical evidence on determinants of
loan spreads can provide insights into risk premiums in ﬁnancial contracting and transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy. This paper demonstrates an issue that suggests care in those
23eﬀorts. We show that there is endogenous matching in the bank loan market, and that OLS
estimation of the loan spread equation is problematic when some characteristics of banks or ﬁrms
are not perfectly observed and proxies are used. To control for the endogenous matching, we develop
a two-sided matching model to supplement the loan spread equation. We obtain Bayesian inference
using a Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation, which transforms a high-dimensional
integration problem into a simulation problem and overcomes the computational diﬃculty.
Using a sample of 1,369 U.S. loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007 ﬁrms from 1996 to
2003, we ﬁnd evidence of positive assortative matching of sizes in the market, that is, large banks
tend to match with large ﬁrms, and vice versa. We then show that for agents on both sides of the
market there are similar relationships between quality and size, which lead to similar size rankings
for both sides and explain the positive assortative matching of sizes. Banks’ risk and ﬁrms’ risk are
important factors in their quality. The Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are markedly
diﬀerent from the OLS estimates, conﬁrming that controlling for the endogenous matching has a
strong impact on the estimates. We ﬁnd that banks with higher monitoring ability charge higher
spreads, and larger banks charge lower spreads. On the other hand, ﬁrms with higher risk are
charged higher spreads, and larger ﬁrms are charged lower spreads.
Not only does the two-sided matching model address the endogeneity problem in estimation
of the loan spread equation, but it also provides a way to gauge agents’ quality. The latter can
be an important feature to include in analyses of various two-sided markets. For instance, in
an empirical study of academic achievements or job outcomes of college students (or students in
graduate programs, etc.), a two-sided matching model can provide estimates of the colleges’ quality
and the students’ ability as useful “by-products”. Other examples include the matchings between
teams and athletes (in NBA, for instance), corporations and CEOs, ﬁrms and underwriters, and so
on. Furthermore, the two-sided matching model enables us to identify the factors that contribute
to agents’ quality, which can point the way for agents who try to improve their standing, such as
colleges that want to attract better students. This suggests that understanding the quality indexes
can play an important competitive role in such markets. We view those issues as interesting avenues
for future research.
24Appendix A. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Matching
The model described in Section 2 is a special case of the College Admissions Model, for which the
existence of an equilibrium matching is proved in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). A new feature of our
model is that there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market: all banks have identical
preference orderings over the ﬁrms and all ﬁrms have identical preference orderings over the banks.
Eeckhout (2000, Corollary 3) shows that in a one-to-one two-sided matching model, the equilibrium
matching is unique if there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market. Below we show
that this suﬃcient condition for uniqueness also applies to our many-to-one two-sided matching
model.
Re-index the banks and the ﬁrms according to the preference orderings, so that i Âj i0, ∀i>i 0,
∀j,a n dj Âi j0, ∀j>j 0, ∀i,w h e r ei Âj i0 denotes that ﬁrm j prefers bank i to bank i0 and j Âi j0
denotes that bank i prefers ﬁrm j to ﬁrm j0.L e tqit be the quota of bank i. The following J-step
algorithm produces the unique equilibrium matching, in which there is perfect sorting. In step 1,
ﬁrm J matches with bank I.I n s t e p 2 , ﬁrm J − 1 matches with bank I if qIt ≥ 2, otherwise it
matches with bank I −1.I ns t e p3 ,ﬁrm J −2 matches with bank I if qIt ≥ 3, otherwise it matches
with bank I − 1 if qIt + qI−1,t ≥ 3,o t h e r w i s ei tm a t c h e sw i t hb a n kI − 2.A n ds oo n .
First, μ is an equilibrium matching. Suppose not, then there exists at least one blocking pair
(i0,j0) such that i0 >μ (j0) and j0 > min{j : j ∈ μ(i0)}. That is a contradiction, since by construction
if i0 >μ (j0) then j00 >j 0, ∀j00 ∈ μ(i0),s oj0 > min{j : j ∈ μ(i0)} can not be true.
Second, the equilibrium matching is unique. Suppose not, then there exists ˜ μ 6= μ such that
˜ μ is also an equilibrium matching. There is at least one match that is in μ but not in ˜ μ.N o w
consider the ﬁrst step in the algorithm that forms a match that is not in ˜ μ. Call that match (i0,j0).
It follows that min{j : j ∈ ˜ μ(i0)} <j 0 and that ˜ μ(j0) <i 0, since all the matches formed in the
earlier steps are in both μ and ˜ μ.T h e r e f o r e(i0, j0) is a blocking pair for ˜ μ, a contradiction.
Appendix B. Conditional Posterior Distributions
We obtain the conditional posterior distributions by examining the kernels of the conditional poste-
rior densities. The conditional posterior distribution of Qb































The conditional posterior distribution of Q
f






























The prior distributions of α, β, γ,a n dκ are N(¯ α, ¯ Σα), N(¯ β, ¯ Σβ), N(¯ γ, ¯ Σγ),a n dN(¯ κ, ¯ σ2
κ),
respectively. The prior distribution of λ is N(¯ λ, ¯ σ2
λ) truncated on the right at 0. The prior
distribution of 1/σ2
ν is gamma, 1/σ2
ν ∼ G(a,b), a,b > 0.
















ˆ α = −ˆ Σα
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ˆ β = −ˆ Σβ
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ˆ γ = −ˆ Σγ
(
−¯ Σ−1






















The conditional posterior distribution of κ is N(ˆ κ, ˆ σ2










































26The conditional posterior distribution of λ is N(ˆ λ, ˆ σ2














































|Jt| denote the total number of loans in all the markets. The conditional posterior
distribution of 1/σ2
ν is G(ˆ a,ˆ b),w h e r e
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30VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE
Dependent Variable
Loan Spread¹ All-In Spread Drawn above LIBOR/100 DealScan
Independent Variables
Bank Characteristics
Salaries-Expenses Ratio¹ Salaries and Benefits/Total Operating Expenses Call Reports
Capital-Assets ratio¹ Total Equity Capital/Total assets Call Reports
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets¹ Cash/Total assets Call Reports
Bank_Size2 Dummy = 1 if the bank has $5 billion to $13 billion assets Call Reports
Bank_Size3 Dummy = 1 if the bank has $13 billion to $32 billion assets Call Reports
Bank_Size4 Dummy = 1 if the bank has $32 billion to $76 billion assets Call Reports
Bank_Size5 Dummy = 1 if the bank has more than $76 billion assets Call Reports
Firm Characteristics
Leverage Ratio¹ Total Debt/Total Assets Compustat
Current Ratio¹ Current Assets/Current Liabilities Compustat
Ratio of Property, Plant, and 
    Equipment to Total Assets¹ PP&E/Total Assets Compustat
Firm_Size2 Dummy = 1 if the firm has $65 million to $200 million assets Compustat
Firm_Size3 Dummy = 1 if the firm has $200 million to $500 million assets Compustat
Firm_Size4 Dummy = 1 if the firm has $500 million to $1,500 million assets Compustat
Firm_Size5 Dummy = 1 if the firm has more than $1,500 million assets Compustat
Non-Price Loan Characteristics
Maturity Loan Facility Length in Months DealScan
Natural Log of Facility Size² Log(Tranche Amount) DealScan
Acquisition Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Acquisition DealScan
General Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is General DealScan
Miscellaneous Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Miscellaneous DealScan
Recapitalization Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Recapitalization DealScan
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. Dummy = 1 if the loan is a revolving credit line with duration < 1 year DealScan
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. Dummy = 1 if the loan is a revolving credit line with duration ? 1 year DealScan
Secured Dummy = 1 if the loan is secured DealScan
¹ Expressed in percentage points.
² Deflated using the GDP (Chained) Price Index.
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources
31Variable Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Observations Deviation
Loan Spread 1369 1.8883 1.1953 0.15 10.80
Salaries-Expenses Ratio 455 24.6241 8.5873 3.1698 58.8139
Capital-Assets ratio 455 8.5533 2.5788 4.6505 32.2950
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets 455 6.9896 4.3929 0.0033 44.2286
Bank Assets ($ Million) 455 72311 124220 15.9774 625256
Leverage Ratio 1369 25.8408 23.1567 0 194.7757
Current Ratio 1369 226.0087 229.2540 7.7253 3167.5310
Firm Assets ($ Million) 1369 1807 6327 1.0579 172828
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets 1369 31.0707 25.2299 0 95.7851
Maturity 1369 32.9094 22.9736 2 280
Facility Size ($ Million) 1369 192.5351 491.9396 0.1954 10202
Acquisition 1369 0.0964 0.2953 0 1
General 1369 0.4624 0.4988 0 1
Miscellaneous 1369 0.0446 0.2064 0 1
Recapitalization 1369 0.2871 0.4526 0 1
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. 1369 0.0599 0.2374 0 1
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 1369 0.6698 0.4704 0 1
Secured Status 1369 0.6560 0.4752 0 1
Table 2. Summary Statistics
32Coefficient Mean Std. Dev.
Constant 8.1109 0.1815***
Leverage Ratio 0.0037 0.0022*
Current Ratio -0.0002 0.0002
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets -0.0053 0.0020***
Natural Log of Firm Assets 0.5039 0.0263***
1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the bank's total assets.
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3. OLS: Bank Size on Firm Characteristics
Coefficient Mean Std. Dev.
Constant 1.1664 0.3757***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio -0.0326 0.0051***
Capital-Assets ratio 0.0330 0.0218
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets 0.0009 0.0117
Natural Log of Bank Assets 0.4699 0.0236***
1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the firm's total assets.
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4. OLS: Firm Size on Bank Characteristics
33Mean Std. Dev. Marginal Effect
Bank Quality Index
Salaries-Expenses Ratio 0.0017 0.0058 0.05%
Capital-Assets ratio 0.0031 0.0189 0.09%
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets 0.0258 0.0117** 0.73%
Bank_Size2 0.4070 0.1496*** 11.32%
Bank_Size3 0.5275 0.1461*** 14.54%
Bank_Size4 0.5380 0.1495*** 14.82%
Bank_Size5 0.3009 0.1466** 8.42%
Firm Quality Index
Leverage Ratio -0.0005 0.0013 -0.01%
Current Ratio 0.0003 0.0001** 0.01%
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets 0.0002 0.0012 0.01%
Firm_Size2 0.1140 0.0830 3.21%
Firm_Size3 0.2902 0.0867*** 8.13%
Firm_Size4 0.1654 0.0873* 4.66%





1. The dependent variables are the quality indexes.
2. Posterior means and standard deviations are based on 20,000 draws from the
    conditional posterior distributions, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in draws.
3. *, **, and *** indicate that zero is not contained in the 90%, 95%, and 99%
    highest posterior density intervals, respectively.
4. Marginal effect is defined as the marginal change in an agent's probability of
    being preferred to another agent due to a unit difference in the variable.
Table 5. Bayesian Inference: Quality Index Equations
34Mean Std. Dev.
Constant 1.6019 0.2072***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio 0.0183 0.0033***
Capital-Assets ratio 0.0151 0.0119





Leverage Ratio 0.0091 0.0011***
Current Ratio -0.0004 0.0001***











Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. 0.1626 0.1057
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. -0.1126 0.0585*
Secured 0.8834 0.0570***
1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. Posterior means and standard deviations are based on 20,000 draws from the
    conditional posterior distributions, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in draws.
3. *, **, and *** indicate that zero is not contained in the 90%, 95%, and 99%
    highest posterior density intervals, respectively.
4. Dummies for years 1997-2003 are included on the RHS of the spread equation.
Table 6. Bayesian Inference: Loan Spread Equation
35Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 1.6721 0.1985***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio 0.0183 0.0031***
Capital-Assets ratio 0.0153 0.0113





Leverage Ratio 0.0089 0.0011***
Current Ratio -0.0004 0.0001***











Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. 0.1628 0.1063
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. -0.1105 0.0588*
Secured 0.8957 0.0569***
1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3. Dummies for years 1997-2003 are included on the RHS of the spread equation.
Table 7. OLS Estimates: Loan Spread Equation
36OLS Bayesian IΔ%I
Bank's Ratio of Cash to Total Assets -0.0011 0.0015 175.36%
Bank_Size2 -0.2078 -0.1757 18.25%
Bank_Size3 -0.2065 -0.1414 46.03%
Bank_Size4 -0.3391 -0.2685 26.29%
Bank_Size5 -0.3184 -0.2785 14.35%
Firm's Current Ratio -0.0004 -0.0004 6.94%
Firm_Size3 -0.2826 -0.3240 12.76%
Firm_Size4 -0.2465 -0.2696 8.59%
Average 38.57%
1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. Only the variables that are significant in the quality index equations are reported.
3. IΔ%I is the absolute percentage difference.
Table 8. OLS vs. Bayesian: Loan Spread Equation









Figure 1. Number of Banks and Number of Firms
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Figure 3. Proportions of Loans in Different Combinations of Size Groups
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